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Negotiations in the Former Soviet Union: New Structure, New Dimensions VICTOR A. KREMENYUK* Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences 2/3 khlebny per l2l8l4 Moscow, Russia Despite a heritage of suspicion toward negotiation, the new states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have negotiated among themselves (and in Russia's case, within itself) to resolve the issues of the Soviet Union's dissolution and to create a new structure of relations and institutions for the future. Special situations have occurred in relations with the Baltic states, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Chechnya, which is a restive part of Russia. Past and future issues need to be distinguished, a new structure for the CIS worked out, and new relations established with the outside world. Key words: negotiation, institutions, asymmetry, independence, interdependence, self-determination. |
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The Russian Way of Negotiating HIROSHI KIMURA* The International Research Center for Japanese Studies 3-2 Oeyama-cho, Goryo Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto 6l0-ll, JAPAN Characteristics of Russian negotiating perceptions, behavior and tactics as reported for the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods are examined as hypotheses for verification against post-Soviet activity. Positive views of struggle and power and negative views of compromise and rhetoric, lack of initiatives, openness and constancy, and tactical ploys are presented. While evidence is not yet available to confirm these traits currently, there is a presumption of continuity that requires verification. Key words: negotiation, strategy, culture. |
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Why Conflicts In The Former Soviet Union Are So Difficult To Negotiate And Mediate MARINA M. LEBEDEVA* Department of Diplomacy Moscow State Institute of International Relations 76 Vernadsky Ave 117454 Moscow, Russia The difficulty in using negotiation and mediation to resolve conflicts in the former Soviet Union (FSU) derives from factors coming both from the Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian periods and from the current transition. Traditional reliance on authority and government centralization led to both reliance on and distrust of central authorities, neither of which is conducive to negotiation. In the transition period, rigidity, change, long-term and short-term uncertainty, distrust, and absence of valid spokespeople all contribute to undermine negotiations. Yet, inevitably, more negotiation and mediation will be needed and eventually used. Key words: negotiation, mediation, uncertainty, authority, trust, change. |
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Facing the Dilemma of Reintegration Versus
Independence in the Transitional Period: Basic Models of CIS Negotiations MARIA G. VLASOVA* Diplomacy Program Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) 76 Vernadsky Avenue ll7454 Moscow, Russia. Negotiations within the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are caught between the contrary directions of new independence and old interdependence, or disintegrationist vs. integrationist tendencies. They are necessary to distribute past assets and value, maintain relations and value, and build new value and institutions. Structurally, relations among the l2 states are asymmetrical around a still-dominant Russia. The negotiations follow one of three patterns: dominative, disintegrative, or integrative. However, disintegrative tendencies and structural suspicions tend to result in loose, weak and unenforced agreements, when indeed agreement is possible. Key words: negotiations, integration, independence, distribution, security point. |
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Lost Opportunities in Negotiating the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh JOHN J. MARESCA* Open Media Research Institute, c/o Open Society Institute 888 Seventh Ave Suite 190l, New York NY 10106, USA. There have been at least six moments in the evolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict in Nagorno Karabakh which can be qualified as lost opportunities for negotiation toward management of the conflict, that is, moments when movement toward resolution could have been produced. These include early CSCE involvement in 1992, cooperation with Russia in 1993, provision of a peacekeeping force in 1993, provision of a special envoy in 1994, use of the CSCE summit of 1994, and use of an oil pipeline after 1994. Other possibilities are also examined; the idea of a special envoy should be retained. Key words: opportunities, conflict resolution, mediation, peacekeeping |
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Ethnopolitics, Strategic Bargaining, And Institutional
Design: Setting The Rules Of Electoral Competition In Post-Soviet Central Asia PAULINE JONES LUONG* Department of Government Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University 1737 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138, USA The purpose of this article is to explore the process by which elites in emerging, multi-ethnic states design new institutions or negotiate the new "rules of the game," combining the use of game theory and social-historical analysis. In doing so, it represents a first attempt to explain why state-builders in a multi-ethnic state exclude some groups while including others. I present my preliminary hypothesis that a new state creates inclusive or exclusive institutions based on its calculated perception of the threat posed by the respective bargaining strategies of the major ethnic groups residing within it, which I argue is directly influenced by the preceding state's institutional structure. In other words, those groups which pose a "credible threat" to the continued rule of present state leaders if excluded will be included, as well as those groups which can help to diffuse this threat. Yet, the assessment of this threat is based largely upon the legacy of the preceding state's institutions and policies. A detailed account of the development of electoral rules in the three newly-independent, multi-ethnic states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan serve as a "critical test" of my hypothesis. Key words: Bargaining, Central Asia, Ethno-politics, Institutional Design, Soviet, State-building, Strategy |
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The Meeting in East-West Negotiations in Post-Soviet
Russia ERIKA SVEDBERG Department of Political Science, Lund University Box 52, 221 00 Lund, Sweden Intercultural communication poses challenges to East-West negotiations in the post Cold War era. The meeting in East-West negotiations is a metaphor for the processes that were set in motion when parties representing Western and Eastern organizations respectively negotiated on cooperation projects. The projects in question were of two types: the profit driven type (joint ventures), and the NGO, non-profit driven type. In applying a relational approach to analyzing negotiations, this paper presents four different typologies of the East-West meeting. The material that forms the basis for these analytical typologies consists of the two parties' perceptions of meeting, negotiating, and cooperating with the Other. The material was gathered via the author's own experience as a negotiator of a Russian-Swedish NGO project between 1991-1994, and also by studying a number of East-West joint ventures and NGO projects in post-Soviet Russia between 1991-96. The four meeting typologies developed in the article are (1) Concurring Perceptions; (2) Mirror Perceptions; (3) Inverted Perceptions; and a type of meeting characterized by a process that has been named (4) Recreating the Other. Key words: post-Cold War cooperation, East-West joint venture, Soviet style of negotiation, intercultural communication, enemy perceptions, Cold War image, cross-cultural awareness, intercultural competence |
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When War Won Out: Bosnian Peace Plans Before Dayton JAMES E. GOODBY* Center for International Security and Arms Control Stanford University 320 Galvez Street Stanford, California 94305, USA. The elements bearing on the prospects for a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina came together in 1995 in a way that made peace possible. These included a forceful U.S. lead in the negotiations, a protracted NATO air campaign, a shift in the local balance of power adverse to the Bosnian Serbs, expulsion of the Serbian population from Krajina, and a readiness of Serbian President Milo(evi( to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. These elements were not present in 1992-94 when two earlier mediation efforts collapsed before peace plans that had a measure of acceptance from the parties to the conflict could be put into effect. The particular internal features of the three plans and the distinctions between them did not cause two of them to fail and one to succeed. To conclude that the 1992-93 plans would have had a chance of succeeding if the United States or the Europeans had used military force to support them is probably not wrong but it misses an important point. There are moments in a dynamic situation when external inputs produce maximum effects while at other times the cost of intervention to achieve a given result is likely to be higher. In catastrophe theory, the condition when external input produces maximum effect within the system is called metastability. The author urges that in analyzing negotiating situations the notion of ripeness take into account the concept of metastability. Key words: Bosnia-Herzegovina; negotiations; metastability; ripeness |
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Backtracking to Reformulate an Acceptable Framework: US-Mediated Talks to Establish a Federation Between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats GEORGE RUDMAN* The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University l740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington DC 20036, USA Upon the failure of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg efforts to devise a formula to deal with the Bosnian problem, the US took over the mediator's role. Instead of coming up with a new formula, it backtracked to parts of earlier proposals and led the parties to a solutions based on an exchange of a Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia for a confederation between that federation and Croatia. This was possible because the moment had become ripe through the development of a perception that continued war was a self-inflicted pain for no chance of unilateral gain, and through the application of side payments of aid and recognition that the mediator could deploy. Key words: mediation, backtracking, ripeness, side-payments. |
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Coercive Mediation on the Road to
Dayton SAADIA TOUVAL Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036, USA The article tries to explain why the American mediation at Dayton resulted in agreement, whereas previous attempts to settle the Bosnian conflict had failed. After examining the evolution of American policies prior to 1995, the article discusses the US initiative of taking the lead in the negotiation, and the methods and tactics it employed. It argues that the military operations against the Serbs do not fit the description of the mediator as a manipulator inducing a mutually hurting stalemate. The military campaign having endowed Western policies with credibility, intimidated the Serbs, and redrawn the front-lines, might be called coercive mediation. It suggests that the description of the mediator as an intervenor who does not employ force needs to be revised. Key words: coercive mediation, formula, leverage, mediation, mutually hurting stalemate, ripeness. |
