Conceptualizing and Measuring Conflict Management Success: An Overview

GARY GOERTZ
Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA, Email: ggoertz@u.arizona.edu

PAUL F. DIEHL
Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 361 Lincoln Hall, 702 S. Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801 USA, Email: p-diehl@uiuc.edu

FRANK HARVEY
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4H6 CANADA, Email: fharvey@IS.Dal.Ca

Abstract. With a new emphasis on conflict management, ascertaining the relative success of peacekeeping missions, negotiations, mediations, third-party interventions, and other such management efforts is crucial to the policy analyst as well as the academic. Conflict management strategies for the international community hinge critically on determining whether certain approaches produce successes or failures. In the academic community, finding consensus on conflict-management success and failure is a prerequisite for theoretical development; without it, we have little more than a collection of descriptive and largely idiosyncratic analyses. In the policy-making community, standards for success and failure are essential for determining when to shift or sustain strategies, when to terminate efforts and withdraw, and whether to employ similar strategies in the future.

Re-Conceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process
BARBARA F. WALTER
Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, Mail Code 0519, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA, Email: bfwalter@ucsd.edu

Abstract. Although the literature on international negotiation is rich with studies attempting to explain why some wars end in negotiated settlements while others do not, the theoretical and empirical work focuses almost entirely on explaining a single dichotomous variable: whether parties reach agreement or not. This article argues that in order to truly understand how conflicts end, the resolution process must be viewed as taking place in three distinct stages which begin with the decision to initiate negotiations, continue with the decision to strike a mutually agreeable bargain, and end with the decision to implement the terms of a treaty. Each of these stages is likely to be driven by very different causal factors, and only by drawing clear conceptual and theoretical distinctions between the stages (and then testing them this way) can we begin to understand the full range of factors that truly bring peace.

Settlements and Resolutions: Consequences of Negotiation Processes in the Laboratory and in the Field

DANIEL DRUCKMAN
Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444 USA, ddruckma@gmu.edu

Abstract. In their 1994 study of divorce mediation, Kressel and his colleagues distinguished between a problem-solving and a settlement-oriented style of mediation. The former led to more integrative agreements and better long-term relationships between the parties than the latter. This distinction has been a basis for a multi-method research program on negotiation and mediation processes in international relations. We have been exploring the consequences of a variety of indicators for outcomes and post-agreement relations among parties. In the laboratory, we have identified the way that sources of conflict (values and interests) lead to processes with different implications for long-term relationships. In case studies, we have identified the political conditions that produce short-term settlements, or stalemates followed by further escalation. In small-N comparative case studies, we have shown how negotiation process and context operate together to influence post-settlement relations and system change. We used a comparison of the conflicts in Karabakh and Mozambique and three cases of base-rights talks as examples. In large-N aggregate case comparisons, we developed empirical profiles of types of negotiation (e.g., innovation vs. re-distribution) with implications for outcomes and relationships as well as the role played by turning points in projecting a process toward agreement and changing escalatory into de-escalatory processes. The variables identified by these studies are organized in terms of a framework that connects issues and objectives, background factors, and conditions with processes, outcomes, and implementation. The framework shows how these variables can lead to integrative agreements.

Patterns of Negotiation in Non-War Disputes

DERRICK FRAZIER and GARY GOERTZ
Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85712 USA (E-mail: frazier@email.arizona.edu; ggoertz@u.arizona.edu)

Abstract. Studies of militarized interstate dispute (MID) outcome variables have focused particularly on whether or not these disputes have resulted in war. With a few exceptions, this simple dichotomous dependent variable categorization largely ignores numerous militarized disputes with outcomes that fall short of war along with their respective settlement method. We propose that theories and findings on war might not apply to non-war disputes. This is especially true when considering approaches to conflict management. We find that: (1) the outcome of war almost always results in one side prevailing. Negotiated settlement and compromise are more likely outcomes of non-war disputes. (2) Power relations play a key role in outcomes of war but have a much-reduced impact on non-war outcomes. (3) Territorial issues are associated with dispute occurrence and war. Territorial issues, at the same time, seem to lend themselves to negotiated and compromise outcomes. (4) Ripeness occurs at the mid-severity range as opposed to lower or higher levels.

The Short-Term Effects of Military Interventions in Civil Conflict

PATRICK M. REGAN
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, P.O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY 13902 USA, Email: pregan@binghamton.edu

Abstract. In this article, I discuss the implications of thinking about conflict management in terms of long and short-term outcomes. In particular, I focus on the role of third-party interventions in civil conflicts and how military interventions can affect the terms of negotiated settlements. I argue that military interventions can be effective if you judge success in terms of short-term outcomes, but even then, there are more or less-effective strategies. After articulating different metrics for considering short-term success, I outline a framework for thinking about how the intervention strategy will influence the duration of a civil conflict, in part by linking battlefield conditions to negotiated outcomes. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of linking military interventions to diplomatic efforts when negotiating a settlement.

Treaties and Conflict Management in Enduring Rivalries

GARY GOERTZ
Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA, Email:
ggoertz@u.arizona.edu

PAUL F. DIEHL
Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 361 Lincoln Hall, 702 S. Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801, USA, Email: p-diehl@uiuc.edu

Abstract. Simply equating treaties with conflict management success distorts a more complex relationship. The relationship of treaties to conflict management depends fundamentally on the kinds of treaties involved and where they occur in the life cycle of rivalries. This paper explores these issues and analyzes how treaties might be understood in the conflict-management process of enduring rivalries. In our conception, two basic categories of treaties play roles relevant to the conflict management of rivalries: security treaties and functional treaties. Security treaties are agreements between rivals that address specifically the issues at stake in the rivalry, or are military-related agreements involving arms control and the like. Functional treaties deal with non-security issues such as trade, the environment, and other matters. We propose that these two kinds of treaties play different roles in the conflict-management process, functioning as independent or dependent variables in the analyses of conflict-management success depending on their type and the life cycle of the rivalry. Our analysis of treaties flows from our punctuated equilibrium model of rivalries and decision-making.