International Negotiation
A Journal of Theory and Practice
| This issue | Guest
editors |
||
| Multiparty Negotiation and the Management of Complexity | Larry Crump, Griffith University |
||
Abstracts Vol. 8, no. 2 2003
Multiparty Negotiation and the Management of Complexity |
|
| LARRY CRUMP School of International Business, Griffith University , Nathan, Q1d.4111 Australia (Email: L.Crump@mailbox.gu.edu.au) |
|
| The present issue of International Negotiation is the second of a two-part set that examines negotiation complexity and its management. This second issue adds to the body of studies in the first (2003, Volume 8, number 1) by exploring multilateral negotiation and the management of complexity from a multiparty perspective. The reader may ask how multilateral and multiparty negotiations differ? Each offers a distinct theoretical lens. For example, the international domain tends to conceptualize complex negotiation processes from a multilateral perspective, whereas studies in the public dispute and organizational domains often frame complex negotiation processes as multiparty encounters. Multilateral literally means “many sided.” Bilateral negotiations are two sided. Because multilateral negotiations involve more than two sides, they necessarily must be multiparty. | |
| Towards a Paradigm of Multiparty Negotiation | |
| LARRY CRUMP School of International Business, Griffith University , Nathan, Q1d.4111 Australia (Email: L.Crump@mailbox.gu.edu.au) and IAN GLENDON School of Applied Psychology, Griffith University, Gold Coast Campus, Southport, PMB 50 Gold Coast Mail Centre Qld. 9726 Australia (E-mail: i.glendon@griffith.edu.au) |
|
| Despite considerable research on multiparty
negotiation, no prior attempt has been made to organize and describe
knowledge from the various disciplines represented within this field
of study. The present article seeks to offer a comprehensive understanding
of multiparty negotiation. It establishes a foundation for a multiparty
negotiation paradigm by building a coherent multi-disciplinary
framework. Development of this framework begins by defining fundamental
concepts and identifying essential dynamics that structure the
field of multiparty negotiation. This article then describes the
building blocks and boundaries of the field. A review of the three
most developed multiparty negotiation bodies of literature or domains – international
negotiations, public disputes, and organizational and group negotiations – follows.
Similarities and differences between the three domains are identified,
as are points of theoretical integration. This examination of multiparty
negotiation concepts and dynamics, building blocks, boundaries,
and domains constitutes a framework that defines multiparty negotiation
as a field of practice. The article also establishes a research
agenda that will contribute to the development of multiparty negotiation
as an area of study. Key words:party, sides, multiparty negotiation, multilateral negotiation, primary party, supporting party, coalition party, third party |
|
| Multistakeholder Dialogue at the Global Scale | |
| LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, BOYD W. FULLER, MICHÈLE
FERENZ and DAVID FAIRMAN Consensus Building Institute, 131 Mt. Auburn Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA (email: sossi@cbuilding.org) |
|
| Multistakeholder Dialogues (MSDs) are being
used as part of many international policy-making efforts. Official
and unofficial representatives are being brought together to build
relationships, set agendas for future official and unofficial dialogues,
and even to generate packages of proposals or recommendations.
The authors describe the key challenges that face prospective MSD
designers, including: finding the right participants, managing
with extremely limited financial resources, providing effective
meeting facilitation, and integrating the work of MSDs into existing
institutional activities and structures. While there are examples
of successful MSDs that contribute to official policymaking, too
many multistakeholder dialogues founder because the participants
are inadequately prepared, the processes are managed ineffectively,
and expectations are unrealistic. Key words:multistakeholder dialogue, international negotiation, international treaty negotiation, multiparty negotiation, parallel informal negotiation, public dispute resolution. |
|
Sustainable Development Diplomacy in the Private Business Sector: an Integrative Perspective on Game Change Strategies at Multiple Levels |
|
| MIKOTO USUI United Nations University, Institute of Advanced Studies , Tokyo , Japan (Email: m_usui@nifty.com) |
|
| This article attempts
to offer an “integral” perspective for locating the business and
industry sector in both political and socio-organizational realms
and for capturing major game change strategies envisaged by this
sector to contribute more or less actively to emerging sustainable
development (SD) regimes. Corporate SD strategies are construed
in terms of “three-level games,”: Level I - changing products through
individual management systems; Level II - changing individual business
environments; and Level III – changing the international institutional
setting. These initiatives help address two overarching preoccupations:
(1) how to free the business-society relationship from excess structural
biases and reconstruct it through industry and other major social
actors engaged in a joint process of “structuration” and (2) how
to harness control over the local-global nexus or “vertical
inter-linkages” in an operationally meaningful way that would help
deepen and broaden existing major multilateral SD agreements. Key words: business-society relationship; local-global nexus; negotiated voluntary agreements; stakeholder engagement; networked minimalism; track-two multilateral diplomacy; Stiglerian threshold |
|
| Sequencing, Acoustic Separation, and 3-D Negotiation of Complex Barriers: Charlene Barshefsky and IP Rights in China | |
REBECCA HULSE |
|
Taking the perspective of the lead U.S.
negotiator, Charlene Barshefsky, this article details and analyzes
the negotiations that took place in the mid-1990s between the United
States and the People's Republic of China over intellectual property
rights (IPR). Employing a “negotiation analytic” methodological
stance, Charlene Barshefsky's actions are interpreted to suggest
a number of promising approaches to managing the daunting complexities
of trade and other negotiations: recognizing the multiparty aspects
of apparently bilateral dealings and capturing them in a “deal
diagram;” carefully assessing “barriers” to agreement; sequencing
to build a winning coalition and overcome potentially blocking
ones; “acoustic separation” of issue-frames; and, most broadly,
changing the game advantageously relative to a purely tactical
orientation “at the table” through 3-D actions away from the table. |
|
| Leadership in Multilateral Negotiation and Domestic Policy: The Netherlands at the Kyoto Protocol Negotiation | |
| NORICHIKA KANIE Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan (Email: kanie@valdes.titech.ac.jp) |
|
This article examines the causal mechanisms
through which domestic policies and underlying domestic structural
and institutional factors influenced the Netherlands ' leadership-taking
potential during recent climate change negotiations. Two mechanisms
are prominent. One is the importance and necessity of building
domestic capacity or leadership potential, and the other is the
capacity of a middle power to become influential in the multilateral
arena. In this case, a regional organization provided the framework
for a middle power to realize its leadership potential. |
|
| Keynes' Attack on the Versailles Treaty: An Early Investigation of the Consequences of Bounded Rationality, Framing, and Cognitive Illusions | |
| WILLIAM P. BOTTOM John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, Room 1133, St. Louis MO 63130 USA (Email: bottomb@olin.wustl.edu) |
|
| The Paris Peace Conference was arguably
the most complex negotiation ever undertaken. The principal product
of the conference, the Treaty of Versailles, failed to accomplish
any of its framers' major goals. Relations between the Allies themselves
and the Allies and their defeated enemies seriously deteriorated
as a consequence of the negotiations and attempts to implement
the treaty. Economic conditions in Germany , the rest of Europe
, and eventually the United States declined as well. At the time
of the Treaty's publication, John Maynard Keynes and a considerable
number of other participants predicted these events, pointing to
the negotiators' errors and oversights as a primary cause. The
logic of Keynes' argument is re-examined in light of recent research
on the psychology of human information processing, judgment and
choice. It reveals that his approach is actually very consistent
with and anticipates both Simon's conception of bounded rationality
and recent work on cognitive heuristics and illusions. Negotiator
bias has been studied almost exclusively using simple laboratory
settings. The catastrophic lose-lose nature of the Versailles Treaty
illustrates the way in which complexity necessitates reliance on
simplifying heuristics while propagating and amplifying the impact
of the bias that is generated. Evidence from the treaty negotiations
and the failed implementation of the treaty suggest some very significant
boundary conditions for the application of rational choice models
in the business, politics, and international relations contexts.
It also demonstrates the need for negotiations researchers to focus
more attention on the implementation of agreements and the long-term
effects of those agreements on relationships. Key words: bounded rationality, framing, cognitive illusions, Versailles Treaty |
|
| Ending Ethnic War: The South Asian Experience | |
P. SAHADEVAN |
|
| Abstract. Underscoring the
linkage between war strategies and peace processes in seven ethnic
wars in the South Asian region, this article examines the conditions
under which two wars have ended in military victory, another two
in negotiated settlement and the remaining three wars still continue.
War strategies of the South Asian governments have effectively
combined military tactics with a wide range of political measures
to strengthen war processes that, in turn, determine the result
of peace processes. This article finds that the pattern of ending
a war or its effective prolongation is determined by the nature
of power relations between the adversaries, which is factored into
the level of mobilization of support in the society, structural
cohesion of rebel groups, patterns of goal setting, and the nature
of rebel leadership and its commitment to the declared goal. |
|
© Copyright 1996-2005 Gregory Kersten & The InterNeg Group
